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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The objective of this study, approved July 1993, was to

investigate current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process.
This report details the findings of five years of research effort.

The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KyTC) is responsible for the creation of a six-year
highway construction plan listing proposed projects which reflects the highway needs of the
state. The General Assembly approves those projects that will be funded in the coming
biennium. Reasonable cost forecasts for new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that
funding is available and projects can be advanced on an orderly schedule.

KRS45.245, effective 1 July, 1992, granted the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation
(IJCT) oversight of the biennial highway plan. Any phase of an authorized highway project-design, right-of-way, utility relocation, or construction--that exceeds the estimate shown in
the plan by 15% must be reviewed by the IJCT. Estimates developed using current methods
did not prove to be sufficiently accurate to preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. During
the reporting period (7/1192 - 6/30/98), 562 overruns totaling approximately $265 million
were submitted to the IJCT--all were approved for additional funding. No concerted effort
was made by the IJCT to track the number of cost underruns. This review requirement was
canceled by the General Assembly (HB 655) during the 1998 legislative session.

Estimates for highway projects are usually the responsibility of the 12 Highway District
Offices, which have few resources allotted to estimating.

Furthermore, initial estimates,

based on very little information, do not statistically support a± 15% confidence level. In light
of the high variability of estimates based on little information and the lack of resources
dedicated to estimating, a reasonable approach is to base estimates on actual costs of past
projects. For the conceptual estimate, the one used for initial authorization of a project, a
cost-per-mile figure based on similar past projects can be used. After the design is completed
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on a new project, estimates for the remaining phases--right-of-way, utility relocation, and
construction--can be updated to reflect design decisions such as route, grade and drain, etc.

A cost-per-mile estimating model, KYEstimate, was developed to assist estimators in making
conceptual estimates using databases of preconstruction (design, right-of-way acquisition,
and utility relocation) and construction project costs for the past six years.

This study collected data for cost overruns, developed construction and preconstruction
databases, established a standard for the storage of data in the databases, and developed a
user-friendly computer program, KYEstimate, to assist estimators to use historic data to make
and/or justify estimates. Training on the program was provided to estimators on request.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This need was recognized by the Kentucky Transportation
Cabinet (KyTC), the Kentucky Legislature and the Federal Highway Administration
(FHW A). A three-year research project was approved by the KyTC and the FHWA, starting
in July 1993, to study current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating
process. The project timetable specified the following annual goals:

•

Year 1 (7/93-6/94) - Study current practices and problems, and make preliminary
recommendations for potential improvement areas.

•

Year 2 (7/94-6/95) - Develop and/or modify procedures and tools to 1mprove the
estimating process.

•

Year 3 (7/95-6/96)- Implement improvements and train KyTC personnel in their use.

In 1996 the study was extended for two years, with the following goals:

•

Year 4 (7/96-6/97) - Collect additional cost data, refine KYEstimate and train KyTC
personnel in its use.

•

Year 5 (7/97 -6/98) - Collect additional cost data.

The impetus for improving cost forecasting for highway work came from a law enacted
during the 1992 General Assembly session. KRS 45.245, effective July 1, 1992, mandated
that the amount authorized for expenditure on any project phase--design, right-of-way, utility
relocation or construction--cannot exceed that stated in the current biennium highway plan
(2YP) by more than 15% without being presented by the KyTC to the Legislature's Interim
Joint Committee on Transportation (IJCT) for review. The presentation to the IJCT included
written certification from the State Highway Engineer that the overrun was caused by
unanticipated circumstances, and provided specific details on the reasons for the cost
overrun. The IJCT determined if the proposed additional money was reasonable and
1

necessary, and also, if any alteration made or planned since its consideration by the General
Assembly materially changed the project. The law was cancelled by HB655 during the 1998
General Assembly and there is no longer a requirement for formal review by the IJCT of cost
overruns.

During the law's six year life, 562 phase overruns > 15%, for a total cost of

approximately $260 million, were submitted to the IJCT and all were approved for additional
funding.

This, the final report, discusses the findings of the five years of the project:
•

Summary of First Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the first
interim report, KTC 94-9, March 1994.

•

Summary of Second Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the
second interim report, KTC 95-12, July 1995.

•

Summary of Third Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the third
interim report, KTC 96-14, July 1996.

•

Summary of Fourth & Fifth Year's Findings - reviews the efforts presented in the fourth
interim report, KTC 97-13, July 1996, and those of the fifth year.

•

Estimates During the Period of Study - presents an analysis of the cost overruns > 15%
that were presented to the IJCT for review during the research period.

•

Cost-per-mile Model - presents a computer model, KYEstimate, that sorts data from the
preconstruction and construction databases to assist an estimator in making a conceptual
estimate based on past performance.

•

Conclusions - reports conclusions based on research findings.

•

Recommendations - makes recommendations based on the research effort.

•

Appendix I- contains explanations for codes used by KYEstimate.

•

Appendix I! -contains breakdown of cost overruns > 15% by causes.
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SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S FINDINGS

The section provides a summary of the status of the research effort when the first interim
report, KTC 94-9, was issued in March 1994. The statements used reflect conditions at that
time and may be updated later in this report to reflect current conditions.

The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky is not satisfactory to
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reporting requirements of the new oversight law,
KRS45.245, impose additional burdens on an already seriously understaffed highway
department. The limits imposed for reporting are in some cases difficult to meet, and in other
cases possible to meet only with additional staffing and/or by not performing current duties.

The choice seems to be to either accept the status quo or to try to mitigate the problem;
Solving the problem entirely--insuring that no project phase overruns its estimate by 15%--is
not reasonable. There are three ways to address the issue of cost estimate deficiencies and
subsequent justification furnished to the Legislature. The first is for the Legislature to either
forego the oversight or to modifY it so the KyTC can meet the requirements with current
staffing levels. The second is for the KyTC to change how the 6YP and the 2YP are
developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve its estimating
ability. All of these options have financial and political implications.

The current oversight requirement had resulted, to date, in 134 overruns worth over $69
million being presented to the IJCT for review. All of these overruns were approved. The
IJCT makes no concerted effort to track cost underruns, which would provide as much
evidence as cost overruns to verifY the accuracy of project estimates. In an effort to address
this problem KyTC is increasing estimates to reduce the possibility of having to report phase
overruns in the future. This practice makes the development of a realistic 6YP and 2YP
unlikely.
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The Legislature could either forego the oversight or modifY it so the KyTC can meet the
requirements with current staffing levels. A statute change would be required to forego the
oversight or to change its provisions. Modifications that could mitigate the current problem
include setting a realistic limit for both overruns and underruns based on the class of estimate
in the 2YP, not 15% across the board; track overruns by overall project cost instead of by
project phase; and/or establish a review process that requires the KyTC to inform the IJCT by
report of all overruns and underruns, but to formally respond with backup data to only those
overruns the IJCT truly thinks may need to be examined, not those that will be summarily
approved.

The KyTC can change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. The most effective change
would be to complete either an in-depth scoping study and/or preliminary design prior to
adding a project to the 6YP. This would require that work performed prior to authorization of
the 6YP be funded by state funds.

The KyTC can staff up to improve its estimating ability. Increased staffing would require
either the Executive Branch's approval for hiring additional personnel and/or KyTC's
commitment to reallocate resources. The increased staffing would primarily include right-ofway and utility personnel to be involved in preliminary estimating. Also, demands for on-thespot estimates would have to be curtailed so the increased staff could scope the proposed
project prior to submitting the initial estimate.

The three ways to mitigate the current problem are being used, to some degree, by other states.
The largest notable difference between Kentucky and most other states is the legislative
oversight requirement. While many states have some sort of progress review of the highway
plan, almost none have legislative involvement after budget approval. Many states are better
staffed for estimating than Kentucky and some states do a considerable amount of preliminary
design work prior to a project being placed on the highway plan.
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Regardless of which of the above-mentioned options, or combinations thereof, are selected to
mitigate the current problem, improvement of the current estimating and cost forecasting
process is possible. Areas this study will address during the next year are: how to better use
existing data, what unused data sources are available, and how to improve current estimating
procedures.

Estimates are a product of experience and information.

Estimating experience has been

disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them
available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating
ability but will serve to help justifY estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate.

This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting ability
and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature.

In order to seize this

opportunity, both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other,
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political
and fiscal realities.
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SUMMARY OF SECOND YEAR'S FINDINGS

The second interim report, KTC 95-12, issued in July 1995, is summarized in this section.
Statements used in this section of the report reflect conditions at that particular time, and may
be changed later to represent current conditions.

Research continues to show that the Legislature should either forego the oversight or modifY it
so the KyTC can meet requirements with the current staffing levels, the KyTC must change
how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed, and/or the KyTC should increase its staff to improve
the estimates.

The current oversight requirement had resulted, to date, in 263 overruns worth over $116
million being presented to the IJCT since the law became effective (7/1192). All of these
overruns were approved.

The IJCT continued to make no concerted effort to track cost

underruns.

Relevant cost data for both preconstruction and construction phases were collected to provide
estimators with cost from past projects. These projects are stored in a manner that allows
estimators to efficientlyselect data useful to their current project.

Projects in both databases are defined by twelve key attributes:
1 District
2 Item#
3 County
4 Type of work
5 Functional classification
6 Number of lanes

7 Length
8 Percent bridge length
9 Number of bridges or major culverts
10 Award year
11 Route name
12 TD-10 Number

District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12
Item # - district identifier number
County - county or counties; by name
Type of work- FHWA Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see Appendix I)
·Functional classifications- KyTC classification system (see Appendix I)
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Number of lanes- number of lanes involved
Length - length in miles to three decimal points
Percent bridge length - [bridge length/project length] x I00
Number of bridges- total number of bridges (or culverts> $50,000) in project
Award year - calendar year project was awarded for construction
Route Name- number of road: US60, KY109, etc.
TD-10 Number- number on the Project Authorization Form
Along with the above attributes are the cost of each preconstruction phase or construction
phase and the fiscal year of the project. The search for data was limited to the last four years
because of missing data related to the twelve attributes. Key characteristics were missing
from many of the projects, precluding their inclusion in the databases.

The cost per mile model, KYEstimate, is written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0 and designed to aid
in the estimating process. The program will allow estimators to access the databases and
select past projects that are similar to a project they want to estimate. The program uses the
length of the project and total costs to calculate the unit costs of the project. The estimators
can then use the historical data or enter their own estimate based upon their past experience.
A stunmary sheet of all pertinent information about the estimate can be printed and/or saved
for later reference. The model is still under development.

A model was also under development using a cost per parcel concept for the right-of-way
phase. This program was also developed in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0. The database was defined
by attributes such as: parcel number, owner's name, parcel type, cost of parcel, area of parcel,
building purchase, and litigation.

The model and data seemed to be insufficient for

determining an accurate cost per parcel. There was an extremely high variation in values for
similar projects, and as a result, this method for developing a conceptual estimate for the
right-of-way phase was abandoned.

A questionnaire was sent to the twelve district highway offices asking about the current
process for developing conceptual estimates, seventy percent were returned.

Responses

showed that although most estimators are comfortable with their conceptual estimates, they
are nol sure what constitutes a good conceptual estimate because of lack of feedback.
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Performance measurements that were being investigated included:
Actual cost of project phases vs. Estimated cost of project phases
·
Number of projects let vs. Number of projects planned to let
Actual Revenues vs. Estimated Revenues
Number of projects negotiated vs. Number of projects litigated
Amount of money received form federal turnovers at end of the federal GY
Standard Deviation of [[A - E]/A]* 100 for each year
Number of project overruns
Number of project underruns
The current process for forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky is not satisfactory to
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and causes
much wasted effort by KyTC personnel. It would be more effective to use different thresholds
for different phases. Another alternative would be to update estimates once the design phase
is completed and a better scope of work is determined. An improvement to the current
process would be to require that only overruns beyond a certain amount be formally presented
to the IJCT and others require only a proper notification.
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SUMMARY OF THIRD YEAR'S FINDINGS

This section provides a summary of the third year's annual report, KTC 96-14, issued in July
!996. The information stated is a reflection of conditions at the time of issue and may be
updated later in this report to indicate current conditions.

Research continues to show that some changes must be enacted to reduce the amount and cost
of overruns. Three possible solutions include: First, the Legislature should either forego the
oversight or modify it so the KyTC can meet requirements with the current staffing levels.
Second, the KyTC should change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. Third, the KyTC
should increase its staff to improve the estimates.

The current oversight requirement had resulted, to date, in 362 overruns worth over $162
million being presented to the IJCT. All of these overruns have been approved for additional
funding. No concerted effort was made by the IJCT to track cost underruns.

The cost-per-mile model, KYEstimate, was refined to incorporate an inflation factor and the
ability to convert the database to metric units. This inflation factor enables KYEstimate to
provide a more realistic prediction of project cost. The conversion of units from English to
metric broadens the scope of the model and enhances its future value. The data are stored in
English units and continue to be used mainly in this format. These changes were brought
about by suggestions of estimators after the first release of KYEstimate.

The databases used for the model were enlarged and transferred into the database program
DBASE IV. Microsoft QUERY was used to pull the data from DBASE IV into KYEstimate
for use. This modification protects the data from being changed during the running of the cost
estimate model and allows for easy addition of new projects to the database. The primary
identifier for the data was changed from the TD-1 0 number to the Item number. These
changes were made to make the data easier for estimators to find and use.
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SUMMARY OF FOURTH AND FIFTH YEAR'S EFFORTS

This section provides a summary of the fourth and fifth year's effort. The fourth year's effort
was reported in interim report, KTC 97-15, June 1997.

The oversight requirement resulted in 362 overruns worth over $162 million being presented
to the IJCT from the time the law became effective (7/1/92) until the fourth interim report. By
the time of cancelation of the IJCT review requirement, 562 overruns > 15% for a total cost of
approximately $265 million were presented by the KyTC. All of these overruns were
approved for additional funding.

The databases used for the model were enlarged using recent preconstruction and construction
cost data. Some changes were made to KYEstimate to allow it to run on updated versions of
Microsoft Excel.

10

ESTIMATES DURING THE PERIOD OF STUDY

Estimates developed usmg current methods have not proven to be significantly accurate to
preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. During the time the IJCT review requirement was in
effect, 711/92-6/30/98, 562 overruns, totaling approximately $265 million were submitted to the
IJCT for approval. All were approved for additional funding.

The following analysis is based on information compiled from all past copies of the Notification

to Legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Transportation Concerning Project Phase
Cost Overruns > 15%. This document, an overrun report, is submitted by the KyTC to the
IJCT for a phase overrun > 15% and is identified by a tracking number. A separate document is
normally used for each phase request. A few documents were numbered and then withdrawn by
the KyTC before consideration by the IJCT. Also, a few documents contained funding requests
for two phases. The number of overruns used in the analysis, 562, differs slightly from the total
tracking numbers.

Figure 1 shows a breakdown of the number of overrun occurrences by phase. Figure 2 shows a
breakdown of overrun costs by phase. These graphs illustrate the percentage of occurrences and
costs for all overruns during the time the law was in effect. The construction phase produced the
most occurrences (2/5) and costs (2/3) of all overruns, followed by the right-of-way phase with
about Y. of the occurrences and 1/6 of the costs. Utility relocation phase contributed about 115 of
the occurrences and 1/10 of the cost. The design phase accounted for the lease occurrences (1/7)
and costs (1/20) of all overruns.
Table 1 shows the cost and frequency breakdown, plus percentages of the totals, by phase, of the
562 overruns. The bold number represent totals for the six years. Numbers in () are for the 1992
biennium, [] for 1994, and {} for 1992. Tables 2-5 show specific overrun causes for each phase
and the number of occurrences of each. Because overruns may have more than one cause listed,
the total number of cause occurrences may be higher than the total number of overruns for a
phase. Appendix 2 contains a list of tracking numbers which refers to the specific documents
included in the count.
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Design

Construction
67%

Construction
40%

20%

Figure I - Overrun Occurrences by Phase

Number of
Occurrences

Phase

Figure 2 - Overrun Costs by Phase

% Occurring

*

Cost of Overruns
(in millions)

%Cost**

Design

91
(41) [29] {21}

16
(21) (16] {12}

$13
(6) [5] {2}

Right-of-way

132
(43) [46} {43}

24
(22)[25] {24}

$46
(15) [14] {17}

18
(15) [17] {21)

Utility Relocation

115
(25)[36] {54)

20
(13) [19] {30}

$27
(7) [9] {11}

10
(7)[11] {13}

Construction

224
(86) [74] {64}

40
(44) (40] {35}

$178
(71) [55] {52}

67
(71) [66] {64}

562
(195) (185] {182}

100

$265
(100) (83] {82}

Totals=

5
(6) (6] {2}

100

* percent of the 562 overruns that occurred in each phase
**percent of the total cost of the 562 overruns ($265,000,000) attributable to each phase
Table 1: Breakdown of Highway Cost Estimate Overruns by Phase.
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Design Phase Overruns

Overruns occurring in the design phase accounted for 16% of the total number and 5% of the
total cost of all overruns: ninety (91) overruns@ $13 million. Table 2 contains a breakdown of
causes of overruns for the design phase. Underestimation of the complexity of the project,
underestimation because consultant fees were higher than the estimated in-house design costs,
initial estimate based on preliminary data, and scope changes due to worse than expected site
conditions were the main causes of design phase overruns. These causes accounted for nearly
90% of all design phase overruns. Due to the low percentage of cost, 5%, the design phase is not
considered a major factor of overruns.

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of
for Design Phase
Overruns

o/o Occurrence
(%of All
Design Phase
Overruns)

Underestimation of complexity of project
necessitating further design effort over what
was originally envisioned

31

35

Underestimation because consultant fees
were higher than the estimated in-house

18

20

Initial estimate based on preliminary plans,
maps, and data

14

15

Scope changes due to site conditions being
worse than expected

9

10

Scope changes due to local and public

8

9

Occurrences as Causes

design costs

pressure & involvement

Table 2: Major Causes of Design Phase Overruns.
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Right-of-way Overruns
Overruns in the right-of-way phase accounted for 24% of the total number and 18% of the total
cost of all overruns: One hundred and thirty two (132) overruns @ $46 million. Table 3 shows
the major causes of overruns for the right-of-way phase.

Initial estimate made with very

preliminary plans, maps, and generalized data; and changes in project scope as a result of
decisions made in design were the two major causes of overruns. These two causes contributed
to over half of the total overruns. Two other major causes are unusually high jury award and land
values increased in vicinity of proposed right-of-way, causing 26.4% of the overruns.

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of Occurrences as
Causes for ROW Phase
Overruns

% Occurrence (% of All
ROW Phase Overruns)

50

31

39

24

Unusually high jury award

25

16

Land values increased in vicinity of
proposed right-of-way

18

11

Changes in project scope aS a result of
worse than expected site conditions

9

6

Initial estimate made with very
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized
data: estimate updated based on more
design detail
Changes in project scope
decisions made in design

as a result of

Table 3: Breakdown of Right-of-way Phase Overruns
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Utility Relocation Phase Overruns

Overruns in the utility phase accounts for 20% of the total number and 10% of the total cost of all
overruns: one-hundred and fifteen (115) overruns @ $27 million. Table 4 shows that the three
most common causes were initial estimate made with very preliminary plans, maps, and
generalized data, changes in scope from design changes, and increased relocation costs. These
causes contributed about 90% of the total causes.

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of Occurrences as Causes for
Utility relocation Phase Overruns

% Occurrence (% of
All Utility relocation
Phase Overruns).

48

31

Changes in project scope as a
result of decisions made in design

39

25

Increase in relocation costs over
what was expected

27

17

Inadvertent omission

15

10

Changes in scope due to worse
than expected site conditions

13

8

Initial estimate made with very
preliminary plans, maps, and

generalized data. Estimate
updated based on more design
detail

Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overruns.
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Construction Phase Overruns

Overruns in the construction phase accounted for 40% of the total number and 67% of the total
cost of all overruns: two hundred and twenty-four (224) overruns@ $178 million. The majority
of overruns still occur in the construction phase.

In addition, the construction phase still

comprises the largest percentage of the total overrun cost, much greater than the three other
phases. Table 5 shows that the major causes for construction overruns was higher than expected
unit bid prices and/or individual work item costs. This one cause contributes one third (1/3) of
the total causes for construction overruns. Two other major causes were changes in project scope
as a result of decisions made in design and changes in scope due to worse than expected site
conditions, contributing a combined 31% of the overruns.

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of Occurrences as
Causes for Construction
Phase Overruns

% Occurrence (% of
All Construction
Phase Overruns).

Higher than expected unit bid prices
and/or individual work item costs

136

38

Changes in project scope as a result of
decisions made in design

58

16

Changes in scope due to worse than
expected site conditions

40

11

Utility work done in construction
phase

32

9

Inadvertent omission

22

6

Initial estimate made with very
preliminary plans, maps, and
generalized data: estimate updated
based on more design detail

25

7

Change in KyTC policy for
contingency percent add-on

13

4

Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns.
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in Tables l-5.
•

While design phase overruns account for 16% of all overruns, they only account for 5%

of the total cost reported. Design phase overruns are not a major problem.
•

Based on the 562 overruns >15%, the following would likely have occurred if estimates

had been subject to the 15% overrun limitation only after the design phase was completed:
•

Approximately 50% of the right-of-way overrun causes would have been eliminated.

•

Approximately 50% of the utility relocation overrun causes would have been eliminated.

•

Approximately 25% of construction overrun causes would have been eliminated.

•

Changes in project scope as a result of worse than expected site conditions contributed

10% of the causes listed for design phase overruns; 6% for right-of-way overruns, 8% for
utility relocation overruns, and 11% for construction overruns. This cause provided fewer
overruns in later bienniums, but increased site investigation by designers and estimators
might reduce these overruns further. However, some soil conditions and contamination will
always present a problem.
•

The construction phase accounted for 2/3 of the total cost of all overruns, but only 40% of

the occurrences. Reducing the construction overruns will have a major impact on the cost to
the state. Approximately 38% of overrun causes could be reduced if accurate unit bid price
data was used.
•

Causes for overruns resulting from omissions in the estimates, transposing numbers, or

switching of work between phases cannot be avoided unless estimates are updated
periodically.
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COST-PER-MILE MODEL
The Cost-per-mile Model, KYEstimate, 1s a computer based program, written m
Microsoft EXCEL 5.0, that:
a) allows an estimator to access the preconstruction and construction databases through
DBASE IV software and Microsoft Query,
b) allows an estimator to select a set of past projects that are similar to the new project,
c) processes the data related to the set of past projects producing a conceptual estimate
based on historical data,
d) allows an estimator to either accept the estimate based on historical data or to enter a
new estimate,
e) provides statistical information about the predicted accuracy of the new estimate
based on past projects, and
f) produces a Summary Sheet with the new estimate and important information about

what the model predictions.

The model, called KYEstimate, is very user-friendly. It went through several iterations
during its development. A copy of the program, with a user's manual, was distributed to
the 12 highway districts in January of 1996. After allowing the estimators a few weeks to
experiment with the model, researchers went to each of the districts to answer questions
and get feedback on the program.

Reception to the program varied across the state. While some estimators seemed pleased
to finally get some help with their conceptual estimates, others were not very receptive to
using the program. The number one complaint of the estimators was the size of the
database.

Many districts only had 15 to 20 projects and therefore could not get a

reasonable estimate.

Estimators were also asked what parts of the program were most beneficial to them, or if
there were unnecessary components within the program. Many suggested that the work
type list was too defined, giving many maintenance projects that just would not be used.
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Others suggested the program provide metric units and that an inflation factor be applied
to the estimate. Each highway district was left with a copy of their district's projects and
asked to make any corrections they felt were needed. Only five of the twelve districts
returned any information on their data.

After the visit with the districts, several changes were made to the model. Most were
only cosmetic changes. Some of the data were moved around to make it easier for the
estimators to find. Item number became the primary identifier rather than TD-1 0 number.
Some classifications in the database were deleted because they were not valuable to the
estimators.

The databases are DBASE IV files, which facilitate updating the data. Upon opening the
program, the database (either preconstruction or construction depending on what the user
specifies) is pulled into the program using Microsoft QUERY. This protects the database
from being changed within the program, but allows someone to update the DBASE IV
file and send it to the districts. The updated copy of KYEstimate was released during
February 1997.

The size of the databases increased as more project phases were completed. With
increases in projects the model becomes more valuable, using a much larger database to
predict unit costs. Problems with incomplete data continue to limit the number of projects
that can be included. Estimators may throw out projects with extremely high or low cost
and still be left with a sufficient number of projects to use for their estimate.

A metric option was added to the program. The database is in English units, but once in
KYEstimate, it may be changed to metric. An inflation factor, default of 3%, is used on
the estimates. Estimators can change the inflation factor if they believe the 3% is not
accurate. Also, the inflation factor is now projected to the approximate time the project
will be used, 2 years for preconstruction and 4 years for construction projects.
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Projects in the database can be selected by nine key attributes:
l
2
3
4
5

District
Construction Fiscal Year
Construction Type
Route
Work Type

6
7
8
9

Number of Lanes
Functional Class
Length
Lane Width

District- state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12
Construction Fiscal Year- year the construction phase took place
Construction Type- types of work done in construction phase (see appendix)
Route- road abbreviation and road number: US 60, KY 109, etc.
Work Type- FHWA Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see appendix)
Number of lanes- number of lanes involved
Functional classification- KyTC classification system (see appendix)
Length - length in miles to three decimal points
Lane Width - the width of the particular route

EXAMPLE
A new estimate is needed for the construction phases of a 2-lane rural resurfacing project
in Clark County. The road length is three miles and includes shoulder improvements.

All information relevant to the estimate is provided on the Estimate Summary Sheet
screen shown in Figure 3 (page 21 ).

After entering the information identifYing the project, etc. (Estimate Identification, Figure
3), the estimator moves to the construction database and selects criteria to use in the
search for completed projects similar to the new project. The criteria are set by selecting
combinations of items under each of the headings in Table 3.

These items may be

combined by using logical queries. In the case of text, the queries may be AND, OR,=,
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THIS ESTIMATE GENERATED BY KYESTIMATE

DESIGN

---

123456

PROJECT ID#
ROAD NAME
DISTRICT
ESTIMATOR
UNITS(ENGIMETRIC)
DATE OF ESTIMATE

us 60
7
J.Walton
ENG

KYEstimate

10/1/98

ROW

UTILITY

CONSTR
58,839
34,225
141,192
24,575
13

DESIGN

ROW

UTILITY

MILES

CONSTR

I

TOTAL
58,839

34,225
141,192
24,575

TOTAL

3.000

3.0

DESIGN

ROW

UTILITY

CONSTR

TOTAL

176,516

176,516

198,670

$198,670

DIST
CONST_FY
CON_ TYPE
ROUTE
WORK_TYPE
#LNS1
FCLASS1
LENGTH
LN_WDTH

Project numbers 920437 and 940637 were deleted from the construction page to leave only 11 projects fitting the above
criteria. Those specific projects had certain conditions that made them unuseful in estimating a project of this type.

Figure 3- Estimate Summary Sheet
KYEstimate developed at the University of Kentucky
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etc. In the case of numbers, the queries may be =, >=, etc. A new system allows the user
to type in his/her selection and click the "Filter" button.

In this case, after trying various combinations, the estimator selects the following:
~onstruction

Rural roads.

database, District

1,

Construction Type_H, Work Type 72,

~

lanes, and

The search of the construction database using these criteria finds the

projects data shown in Table 6.
Table 7 Search Results
DISTRICT ITEM NO LENGTH

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

920302
920302
940372
910301
910301
920765
940372
930182
930182
930182
940637
920437
940637

0.856
6.024
5.356
1.016
4.269
6.74
0.584
8.241
1.613
0.226
0.472
1.853
2.535

LN WDTH TOTAL

9
9
10
6
8
11
12
10
9
10
11
12
10

18146
145489
183082
31906
140776
265621
24789
362919
77096
13867
34622
179451
327550

FY
1992
1992
1994
1991
1991
1992
1994
1993
1993
1993
1994
1992
1994

UNIT
COST

UNIT
COST
INFLATED
$21,199
$23,859
$24,152
$27,183
$34,183
$36,264
$31,404
$36,405
$32,976
$38,229
$39,410
$44,356
$42,447
$45,032
$44,038
$48,122
$47,797
$52,229
$61,358
$67,048
$73,352
$77,819
$96,843
$108,998
$129,211 $137,080

The cost-per-mile of the selected past projects is calculated and presented on the screen
(Statistical Analysis, Figure 3).

The estimator can use the estimates for each phase determined by means of the actual
costs of past projects in the selected set or enter a new estimate. If a new estimate is
entered, statistical information about the probability of the estimate's accuracy based on
past data is presented (User Estimate, Figure 3). The estimate to be used in the six-year
plan is shown (6 YP Estimate, Figure 3). The estimator then records the criteria used for
the set of projects used in the trial estimate (Search Criteria, Figure 3. ).

Also, any

justification for the new estimate being higher or lower than the historical data would
predict is recorded (Estimate Justification, Figure 3).
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The model, while simple in concept, is actually quite complex.

An experienced estimator would likely make a better estimate than would KYEstimate.
However, an experienced estimator is not always available, and it is sometimes difficult
to justifY an estimate when actual costs are quite different.

Using KYEstimate and

making a new estimate in line with past experience is a conservative approach to
conceptual estimating and provides justification based on past experience.
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CONCLUSIONS

The process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky, in 1992, wasn't satisfactory
to either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reporting
KRS45.245, imposed additional work on the KyTC.
Votls

requir~ments

of the oversight law,

Th~~1(s imposed, whereby reporting

requiied, were in some cases impossible to meet, and, in other cases, possible to meet

only with additional staffing and/or by some staff members not performing normal duties.

The oversight requirement (7/92-7 /98) resulted in 562 overruns worth approximately

$26~

million being presented to the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation for review. All of
these overruns were been approved.

The IJCT made no concerted effort to track cost

underruns which demonstrate a poor estimate as much as an overrun.

The overrun threshold, > 15%, was arbitrary and caused a lot of wasted effort by KyTC
personnel. It would have been better to use different thresholds for different phases, or to
allow updating estimates once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is
available.

The conceptual estimating process can be improved by using actual costs of past projects to
develop estimates for new projects.
projects.

To do this requires that critical data be kept on all

KYEstimate can process historical data to allow estimators to use only those

projects with like characteristics when preparing a new estimate.

Estimates for right-of-way costs have not seen improvement with use of actual costs of past
projects. The cost per parcel model and database that was being developed showed a high
variation in unit costs and was abandoned.

Estimates are a product of experience and information.

Estimating experience has been

disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them
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available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating
ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate.

This study offered an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting
ability and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. A tool was developed
that should improve the KyTC's conceptual estimating ability as well as provide justification
for estimates that vary widely from actual costs.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made, based on the findings of this five-year study.

•

Look for innovative ways to improve both estimates and relations with the Legislature.

•

Educate legislators in the art/science of estimating and the limitations of what can be
done with current resources.

•

Develop and maintain statewide and regional databases of highway costs.

•

Assign more resources to estimating, with a method to account for their utilization.

•

Set up a budget from either new or reallocated funds for the estimating effort, so that a
cause and effect relationship can be established.

•

Develop a standard estimating procedure and train all estimating personnel on its use.

•

Establish a formal review policy and schedule for all estimates.

•

Require an estimator's name, date and estimate class for all estimates appearing on the

Project Authorization Form (TC-1 0).
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APPENDIX I
I.

Planning phase, project planning studied

p

2.

Design phase, design projects

D

3.

Right-of-way phase, right-of-way projects

R/W

4.

Construction phase
a. Grade, drain, and surfacing
b. Grade and drain
c. Surfacing on new route or reconstruction
d. Bridge construction
e. Roadside improvement
f. Traffic Services
g. Service facilities
h. Resurfacing

u

c

G

s
B
I
T
F
H

Functional Class Codes
1. Rural Principal Arterial - Interstate
2. Rural Principal Arterial- Other
6. Rural Minor Arterial- Other
7. Rural Major Collector
8. Rural Minor Collector
9. Rural Local Road
11. Urban Principal Arterial- Interstate
12. Urban Principal Arterial- Freeway/Expressway
14. Urban Other Principal Arterial
16. Urban Minor Arterial
17. Urban Collector
19. Urban Local Street

RPAI
RPAO
RMNA
RMJC
RMIC
RLR
UPAI
UPAFE
UOPA
UMNA

uc
ULS
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Work Type Classification
Code
010
020
031
032
033
034
035
040
050
060
071
072
077
078
080
081
082
090
091
092

Explanation
New Route
Relocation
Reconstruction to Freeway
Reconstruction with More Lanes
Reconstruction to Wider Lanes
Pavement Reconstruction with Alignment Improvements
Pavement Reconstruction
Major Widening
Minor Widening
Restoration and Rehabilitation
Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements and Portland Cement Concrete
Pavement Restoration
Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements and Bituminous Pavement
Restoration
Resurfacing with Portland Cement Concrete Pavement Restoration
Resurfacing with Bituminous Pavement Restoration
Bridge Replacement
Bridges Rehabilitation
Minor Bridge Rehabilitation
Safety
Traffic Control Systems
Environmental Enhancement
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APPENDIXII

. Phase 0 verruns
Major Causes o f Des1gn

# Occurrences

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Contributing Track Numbers

as Causes

Underestimation of complexity of project
necessitating further design effort over what was
originally envisioned

31

6,26,50,88,90,94,95,99, 139, 140,141,158, 175,176,183 [12, 14,
53,54,55,59,65, 71, 79, 121,146, 152] ( 5,88, 89,143}

Underestimation because consultant fees were higher
than the estimated in-house design costs

18

5,42,43,50,76,77,96, 97,106,109 [71,77,79] (98,99,106,128,
139,140}

Initial estimate based on preliminary plans, maps, and
data

14

7,8,9,60,61,62,63, 107,161 [49, 159, 163,169] (25,37}

Scope changes due to site conditions being worse than
expected

9

3 [48, 164,169,172, 173] ( 53,96,1 09}

Scope changes due to local and public pressure &
involvement

8

[25,42,43]

Major Causes of Right-of-way Phase Overruns
# Occurrences

Cause/Justification
ofOvenun

Contributing Track Numbers

as Causes

Initial estimate made with very preliminary plans,
maps, and generalized data: estimate updated based
on more design detail

50

6,26,50,88,90,94,95, 113,136,138,154, 156,160,165 [8,26,41,
50,56,57,58,61 ,89,91,92,93,94,96, 103,118,135, 138] (3,6,7,9,
10, 16,40,59,69,71, 102,105,117,124,139,152,154, 159}

Changes in project scope as a result of decisions
made in design

39

73,87,89, 118,155,167,168 [1 0, 11, 16,21,23,39,51,52,58,62,
89,116] (3,24,51,55, 62,63,70,71,76,83,86,95,108, 117,118,
127,139,140,141, 158}

Unusually high jury award

25

1,2,3,25,48,53,71,83, 114, 157,166,192,193 [58,88,90, 102,
116,118,139,153,154, 160,161] (58}

18

14,59,69, 74, 75,84,86,87,89 [ 10,56,85, 93, 112,138, 144] 116,
158}

Land values increased in vicinity of proposed
of-way

right~

Changes in project scope as a result of worse than
expected site conditions

9

59 [38,57,61 ,93, 132] (38,59, 136}
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Major Causes of Construction Phase Overruns
Cause/Justification
of Overrun

# Occurrences
as Causes

Contributing Track Numbers

Higher than expected unit bid prices and/or individual
work item costs

136

l2, l6, l7, l8, l9,20,2l ,22,23,24,29,30,3l ,36,39,45,46,47,54,
66,78, 79,80,8l ,82,85,93, l 04, !05, !19, 120, l2l, 122, l26, l27,
l28, l29, l30, l3l, !33, 134,135, !43, 147,148, l50, lS!, !52, 163.
164, l78,!79, 180, 181' 182, !84, 185, !89, 194, l95, 196 [3,4,
7, !9,20,28,29,30,33,35,36,3 7,44,46,47, 60, 66,67,68,75,76,
8!,82,86,98,99, l 00, l 05, l 06, !07, l 08, l 09, 1!3, 114, liS, 120,
124,125, !26, 127, 129,130, 13!, 142,148, !49, !51' !56, !57, 165,
166, 167] { 12, 15, !9,20,21 ,26,28,34,35,42,43,44,46,47,54,56,
57,66, 79,142,14 7, !51, !57}

Changes in project scope as a result of decisions made
in design

58

16,21 ,29,3 7,38,45,57,58,82, 102,145,146, !53, 162 [5, 7, 15,33,
45,66,69,1 00,1!3, !30, 141,143, 170,!7!] { 13,18, 21,26,30,31'
34,35,41,46,54,56,6!,66,74,79,80, l 01, l 07, !10, Ill, 112,125,
126,!47,148, 149, !50, 151,155)

Changes in scope due to worse than expected site
conditions

40

1!,30,39,56,187,188 [20,27,46,47,70,75, 82,114,124,!48,!49,
ISO, !51, !56] { 14, 17,27,32,33,65,73,74, 78, 82,84,85,92,94,
97,112, !!3, 142, !51, !56}

Utility work done in construction phase

32

12, 17,21,24,30,3! ,57,58,85!26, 144,149, lS! ,152, !53, !64
[3,5, 7,34,60,66, 76,81, 113, !56, !68] {45, 1!6,126, !50, !57)

Inadvertent omission

22

18,21,55, l 00 [19,45,69, l 00, l 05, l 06,131' 137,150,!51' !56,
168] { 19,42,43,85,93, 101}

Initial estimate made with very preliminary plans,
maps, and generalized data: estimate updated based
on more design detail

25

19,23,35,36,56,!23,!23,!25,132,186 [46, 47,80,81,109,1!4,
127,128, 129,142,143,167] {15,29,57,81}

Change in KyTC policy for contingency percent add-

13

[30,35,36,45,46,47,67,68,86, 148,149, !50, !51]

on
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